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In October of 1983, Donald V. Morano stood before the 
United States Supreme Court and argued his position in 
Dixson v. United States.2 In his thick New England accent, he 
argued that his clients, city officers responsible for the 
management and expenditure of federal funds, were not 
“public officials” within the definition of a federal bribery 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, which prohibits offering something of 
value to a public official with the illicit intent of influencing an 
                                                          
1 Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of the 
Lincoln Memorial University Law Review. The author would like to 
thank Assistant Professors Akram Faizer and Melanie Reid for their 
substantive knowledge, valuable criticism, and unwavering 
encouragement.      
2 465 U.S. 482 (1984) (holding that executives of private,  nonprofit 
corporation having operational responsibility for administration of 
federal housing grant program within city under terms of subgrant 
from city were “public officials” within meaning of federal bribery 
statute, and thus were subject to prosecution under statute).  
112                                                 4 LMU LAW REVIEW (2016) 
 
official act. If his clients were not public officials within the 
meaning of the statute, then they could not be convicted under 
the statute.  
At a superficial glance, a question of this nature would 
appear immaterial. The defendants were criminals who 
misappropriated funds for an amount of personal gain. Why 
care whether federal or state law pursued them? They were 
malefactors; they deserved punishment; (seemingly) end of 
story. However, a second, more careful look reveals the issue 
was not only material, but foundational-- foundational in that 
the prosecutorial authority and role of the federal government 
was arguably beyond the federal scope, i.e., beyond the role of 
the federal government. 
Fearing the Court would rule unfavorably in Dixson, 
Congress quickly augmented § 201 by passing 18 U.S.C. § 666, 
which detailed federal program bribery. Section 666 serves as 
a statutory mechanism for the federal prosecution of bribery 
and corruption of persons who are not federal employees or 
“public officials” under § 201. It is § 666 which draws similar, 
arguably more complicated, foundational issues.  
The role in and authority of the federal government to 
prosecute federal corruption charges levied against state and 
local officials has historically been a relatively uncontentious 
issue. However, the development of so-called New Federalism 
principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in, 
most notably, United States v. Lopez3 and United States v. 
Morrison,4 caused far-reaching stir. The stir’s effect raised the 
question of whether § 666, the bribery statute applicable to 
state and local officials, was legislated with proper 
congressional authority.  
Part One of this note will discuss the elements and 
jurisprudential evolution of § 201, which criminalizes the 
                                                          
3 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the Gun Free School Zone Act 
exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority, since possession of 
gun in local school zone was not economic activity that substantially 
affected interstate commerce).  
4 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding the Commerce Clause did not provide 
Congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), inasmuch as the  relevant 
provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected 
interstate commerce).  
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bribery of federal officials and the payment or receipt of 
official gratuities. Part Two will detail federal program bribery 
under § 666, which criminalizes the bribery and corruption of 
non-federal employees, including state and local officials. Part 
Three will dissect New Federalism and its impact on the 
discussion surrounding the federal interest on which 
congressional authority to pass § 666 rests. Finally, Part Three, 
set against the backdrop of one of Tennessee’s infamous 
corruption investigations, Operation Rocky Top, will attempt 
to provide a solution to the illusive, missing federal interest in 
the prosecution of corrupt state and local officials by adding a 
requirement to § 666’s jurisdictional hook. Such a solution 
potentially satisfies federalism principles while keeping the 
federal anti-corruption statues intact. 
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF § 201 
 
Due to the supplementary nature of § 666, it is nearly 
impossible to meaningfully discuss § 666 without addressing 
the statutory section which it supplements, § 201. Section 201 
covers two branches of corruption: bribery5 and illegal 
gratuities.6 Both bribery and illegal gratuities require proof 
that (1) with illicit intent, (2) something of value was 
requested, offered, or given to a (3) public official, with the 
goal of (4) influencing an official act.7 
An act of bribery differs from an illegal gratuity in a 
crucial respect, the intent element. Bribery8 requires quid pro 
quo— an official act in exchange for something of value.9 An 
illegal gratuity, on the other hand, requires that the thing of 
value be offered or solicited “otherwise than as provided for 
the proper discharge of [the federal official’s] official duty[.]”10 
In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California,11 the 
Court elaborated on this distinction. The Court stated that the 
                                                          
5 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014). 
6 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2014).  
7 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2014).  
8 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2014) (applicable to the offeror/payor);18 
U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2014) (applicable to the offeree/payee).  
9 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).  
10 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2014).  
11 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
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illegal gratuities prohibition,12 unlike the bribery statute did 
not require a connection between the offeror’s intent and the 
specific official act. Thus, for the purposes of illegal gratuities, 
the intent requirement is satisfied if the offeror sought merely 
“to build a reservoir of goodwill” which may be connected to 
a future or past unspecified act.13 
 
A. QUID PRO QUO AND CORRUPT INTENT 
 
 Under § 201’s bribery prohibition, the corrupt intent 
element is intertwined with the concept of quid pro quo. 
Foundationally, in United States v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit 
held that “[section 201’s intent element required that] the 
government must show the money was knowingly offered to 
an official with the intent and expectation that, in exchange for 
the money, some act of a public official would be 
influenced.”14 The money must be given with more than 
“some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit on 
the part of the donor.”15 
 An adjacent issue is what if the illegal quid pro quo 
bargain goes unfulfilled? Under § 201, the offense is complete 
when a bribe or gratuity is either offered or solicited.16 The 
bargained for act need not be done to give rise to criminal act. 
Additionally, if the offeree never performs the requested 
action or has no authority to perform, a criminally briberous 
act has nonetheless been committed.17  
As an illustration, in United States v. Valle, the 
defendant, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent, 
solicited a $20,000 bribe from an immigrant in return for 
removing “criminal charges” from the immigrant’s file.18 The 
defendant knew the file contained no criminal charges, and as 
a result, he argued that he never intend to follow through. 
                                                          
12 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2014) (applicable to the offeror/payor); 18 
U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (2014) (applicable to the offeree/payee).  
13 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 405.  
14 United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980).  
15 Id. (citing United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976)).  
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).  
17 United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2008).  
18 Id. at 343.  
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Thus, he argued, he could not be convicted.19 The court 
rejected this argument, citing the Second Circuit case of United 
States v. Meyers.20 In Meyers,21 a defendant unsuccessfully 
asserted the defense that he was “playacting,” i.e., never 
intended to commit the act for which the bribe was 
exchanged.22 
 In response to such reasoning, Judge Weiner offered an 
intriguing dissent in Valle.23 He reasoned that if the offeree has 
no legal authority or actual ability to do the official act, then 
the offeree could “never have specifically intended to deliver 
the quid pro quo required by Sun-Diamond. . . .”24  Valle is 
significant because it is an ideal example of the statutory 
interpretative lengths to which courts have gone to expand the 
conduct covered under § 201’s umbrella, as evidenced by 
Judge Weiner’s well-reasoned specific-intent objection to the 
majority’s holding.  
Moreover, if § 201 had been ruled inapplicable to the 
facts of Valle, it is not as if the defendant would have walked 
out the courthouse doors. Under the same facts, the defendant 
was convicted of extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872.25 The 
extortion statute, unlike § 201, required no interpretational 
gamesmanship to fit the crime. 
 
B. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES- “OFFICIAL ACT” 
 
Another element of § 201 requires that the briberous 
actor seek to influence an “official act.”26 Generally, courts 
have also read the “official act” language broadly to force the 
statute fit the crime.27 In United States v. Biaggi, the court held 
that the statute “refers to ‘any’ action taken on a matter 
brought before the public official in [the official’s] capacity.”28  
                                                          
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 347.  
21 United States v. Meyers, 692 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1982).  
22 Id. at 831. 
23 Valle, 538 F.3d at 350 (5th Cir. 2008) (Weiner, J., dissenting).  
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 352. 
26 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(a).  
27 See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 97-99 (2nd Cir. 1988).  
28 Id. at 98. 
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However, the D.C. Circuit had a different perspective 
on the interpretation of “official act.” In Valdes v. United 
States,29 the D.C. Circuit read the “official act” requirement 
narrowly. In that case, an officer searched a law enforcement 
data base to obtain vehicle registration information in 
exchange for cash from an undercover informant. The D.C. 
Circuit reasoned that the “officer’s actions” lacked a 
sufficiently “formal” relationship to his official duties, and 
thus, an official act was not influenced.30 The court provided a 
helpful example: 
 
[A]sking questions (of people, databases, and 
real evidence) is certainly a part of 
investigating. . . . But it would constitute an 
enormous expansion of the gratuities provision 
to define “action” on a “matter” as 
encompassing every question asked and 
answered, or even every question that 
somehow parallels those an official might ask 
as part of his official duty and whose answer 
might entail a use of government resources. It 
would bring under the clause a broad range of 
moonlighting activities that in any way 
paralleled an official's regular work (and 
perhaps that of a broad spectrum of fellow 
workers, as well). Thus, a Department of Justice 
lawyer who used a government Westlaw 
account to look up a legal question for a friend 
would be, in the dissenters' view, “deci[ding]” a 
“question” that might “be brought before 
[him].”31 
 
This D.C. Circuit rationale signaled that the seemingly ever-
expanding, nearly-boundless scope of federal corruption 
statutes must have limits.  
 
C. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES - “THING OF VALUE” 
 
                                                          
29 Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
30 Id. at 1342-3.  
31 Id. at 1326.  
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Section 201 also requires that the offeror offer, or the 
offeree accept, something of value for an official act. The 
“thing of value” has been understood to comprise anything 
that has a subjective value to the accepting party, the offeree.32 
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams,33 held that 
“corruption of office occurs when the officeholder agrees to 
the misuse of his office in the expectation of gain, whether or 
not he has correctly assessed the worth of the bribe.”34  
 
D. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES- “PUBLIC OFFICIAL” AND 
DIXSON V. UNITED STATES 
 
As the final, heavily litigated element, § 201 requires 
that the bribe or gratuity be offered, requested, or received by 
a “public official” or a “person who has been selected to be a 
public official.”35 This element brings us squarely back to the 
Supreme Court chamber in October of 1983 with Donald 
Morano. Following opening pleasantries and rehearsed 
opening points, the degree to which most Justices were 
unconvinced by Morano’s defensive argument was evident 
from the tone of their questions and responses to Morano’s 
less-than-helpful answers.36    
In the midst of oral argument, Morano’s sympathizers 
showed their cards as well. For instance, during the 
government’s segment, Justice O’Connor stated, “It is 
somewhat of a concern to think that any potential recipient of 
federal money might be subject to [§ 201].”37 The 
government’s advocate, Richard G. Wilkins, responded by 
stating, “Certainly, it is a matter of some concern, but . . . [§ 
201] applies only to a person acting for or on behalf of the 
                                                          
32 See generally 1 SARAH N. WELLING ET AL, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AND RELATED CIVIL ACTIONS § 7.3 (1988).  
33 United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
34 Id. at 623.  
35 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) & (2) (2014).  
36 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, Oyez: U.S. Supreme 
Court Media, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-
1989/1983/1983_82_5279#sort=vote.  
37 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, Oyez, at 34:15 (Justice 
O’Connor speaking).  
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United States in an official function, so it isn’t just anyone who 
receives some sort of federal fund or some sort of federal 
subsidy.”38  
The Court found the government’s answer persuasive 
because it echoed similar sentiments in its majority opinion. 
The majority held that § 201 was a comprehensive statute 
applicable to all persons performing activities for or on behalf 
of the United States.39 Articulating in more detail, the Court 
pronounced “the proper inquiry [when determining whether 
an individual is a public official] is not simply whether the 
person had signed a contract with the United States or agreed 
to serve as the Government’s agent, but rather whether the 
person occupies a position of public trust with federal 
responsibilities.” Thus, in Dixson, despite Congress’s fear it 
would rule otherwise, the Court concluded that “[t]he 
government has a strong and legitimate interest in prosecuting 
[local officials in charge of distributing federal funds] for their 
misuse of government funds,” due to the fact that these 
officials had the sort of national, public trust Congress 
intended to encompass.40 
 
E. JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S DISSENT IN DIXSON 
 
In Dixson, Justice O’Connor found the majority’s 
“public officer or employee with federal responsibilities” 
answer to be overly inclusive and vague, and she sought to 
provide legal ammunition to those who might challenge the 
majority’s broad interpretation of “public official” in the 
future. Her dissent, in which an unlikely cast of Justices 
Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined, maintained the 
position that grantee autonomy,  i.e., the independence and 
relatively high level of discretion of  a state or local grantee 
with regard to how federally granted funds are used, should 
be determinative.41 “The main defining characteristic of the 
category is the principle of grantee autonomy: although grants 
impose conditions on the use of grant funds, grantees are left 
                                                          
38 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, at 34:23 (Richard G. 
Wilkins speaking).  
39 Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984).  
40 Id. at 482. 
41 Id. at 508 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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considerable discretion to design and execute the federally 
assisted programs without federal intrusion.”42 As a result, 
grants-in-aid to state or local governments, managed and 
dispersed by their state and local employees or contractors, 
should be treated as categorically different from other types of 
federal activities.43 Thus, Justice O’Connor reasoned, § 201 was 
not applicable to facts of Dixson.44 
Justice O’Connor expounded on this concept of grantee 
autonomy by explaining the principle has particular 
importance in two circumstances. First, grantee autonomy is 
strongest in “block grant” programs, such as the program at 
issue in Dixson. “In such programs, federal control over the 
spending of the distributed funds is minimized, and the grant 
recipient cannot plausibly be said to be acting for anyone but 
itself.”45 Second, due to longstanding federalism principles, 
“the principle of grantee autonomy applies with special force 
when federal grant recipients are state or local 
governments.”46 She stated: 
 
Such principles must shape the construction of 
the statutory language . . . [And] demand a 
strong presumption that state and local 
governments are carrying out their own 
policies and are acting on their own behalf, not 
on behalf of the United States, even when their 
programs are being funded by the United 
States.47 
 
In the years that followed Dixson, circuit courts 
embraced the “public officer or employee with federal 
                                                          
42 Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 504 (definition of “grant” requires that “no 
substantial involvement is anticipated between the executive agency, 
acting for the Federal Government, and the State or local 
government or other recipient during performance of the 
contemplated activity”)). 
43 Dixson, 465 U.S. at 508 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 510-11.  
45 Id. at 509. 
46 Id.(citing See Shapek, MANAGING FEDERALISM: EVOLUTION 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRANT-IN-AID SYSTEM (1981)).  
47 Dixson, 465 U.S. 509-10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
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responsibilities” rationale of the majority and were reluctant to 
seize and act on the grantee-autonomy distinction articulated 
in Justice O’Connor’s dissent.48  
As a final note, the expansion of § 201’s applicability 
widened further in 2001 when a private citizen, who performed 
some delegated government function, was held to be a “public 
official.” In United States v. Thomas,49 the Fifth Circuit held that 
a prison guard who was employed by a private company, 
which contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service to run a prison, and who performed the same duties, 
had the same responsibilities and potential criminal 
culpability as a federal prison guard.50 
 
III. 18 U.S.C. § 666 - FEDERAL PROGRAM BRIBERY 
 
Congress feared the Supreme Court would rule the 
opposite way it did in Dixson, i.e., that the defendants, city 
employees in charge of dispersing and managing federal 
funds, were not public officials under § 201, so as an 
uncharacteristically preemptive measure, Congress 
augmented § 201 with § 666 while Dixson was being litigated.51 
This federal program bribery statute is a mechanism by which 
the federal prosecution of bribery may be undertaken against 
persons who are not federal employees or “public officials.” 
Rather than predicate the statutes applicability on federal 
employment or public official status, § 666 predicates its 
applicability on the receipt of federal “benefits.”52 
The statute makes it a federal criminal offense if (1) an 
agent of a state, local government or agency (2) corruptly 
solicits or accepts anything of value of $5,000 dollars or more 
(3) intending to be influenced in connection with any 
transaction the state or local organization for whom the agent 
                                                          
48 See, e.g., United States v. Strissel, 920 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(executive director of city housing authority who distributed HUD 
funds); United States v. Velazquez, 847 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(county deputy who worked in local jail with contract to house 
federal prisoners). 
49 240 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2001). 
50 Thomas, 240 F.3d at 448.  
51 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997).  
52 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2014).  
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works, and (4) such organization receives $10,000 in federal 
benefits within a year’s time.53 
The statute met its first major challenge in 1997 when 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer whether 
government must prove the bribe at issue, in some way, 
affected federal funds before the bribe violated § 666(a)(1)(B). 
The case, Salinas v. United States, involved the chief deputy of a 
state prison facility.54 The facility housed several federal 
prisoners, and in exchange for housing them, the state facility 
received considerable federal funds, and these funds easily 
constituted $10,000 in benefits required by § 666.55 The chief 
deputy at the facility received two designer watches and a 
truck, which had a value greater than $5,000, in exchange for 
allowing a federal prisoner conjugal visits.56  
The defense made a nexus argument which would 
require the federal government to prove that the bribery 
affected federal funds in order to convict a state or local actor 
under § 666. Focusing on the word “any” in § 666(a)(1)(B), the 
Court stated the statute broadly encompassed an agent of a 
state or local government which receives $10,000 in federal 
benefits be influenced or rewarded in connection with any 
business, transaction, or series of transactions of the defined 
organization, government or agency.57 As a result, the Court 
held that the “expansive and unqualified [language], both as 
to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered” does not 
support the argument that federal funds must be affected 
before the acts could be criminal in nature.58 
 
A. 18 U.S.C. § 666 - CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 
CHALLENGE TONED IN FEDERALISM 
 
The Salinas opinion was equivocal, and as an 
aftereffect, a circuit split developed on the issue of whether the 
                                                          
53 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) & (d)(5) (2014). The statute provides the 
applicable punishment, a fine and imprisonment of “not more than 
ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2014). 
54 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 52.  
55 Id. at 54. 
56 Id. at 55.  
57 Id. at 57.  
58 Id. at 52.  
122                                                 4 LMU LAW REVIEW (2016) 
 
criminal acts prohibited by § 666 required any type of nexus 
between the corrupt act and a risk to federal funds. To address 
this split, the Court heard the case of Sabri v. United States.59 As 
a ramification of the presented nexus issue, congressional 
authority to enact § 666 became integral to the proceedings 
and decision.  
Sabri concerned a member of the Minneapolis 
Community Development Agency (“MCDA”) and a real estate 
developer.60 Both were accused of violating § 666(a)(2) when 
each was involved in bribes and kickbacks, which exceeded 
$5,000, relating to various regulatory approvals and eminent 
domain proceedings.61 Minneapolis received approximately 
$29,000,000 per year in federal funds, and the MCDA received 
$23,000,000 per year, which easily satisfies the statute’s other 
jurisdictional requirement.62  
Sabri raised a facial challenge to the statute when he 
argued, “the law can never be applied constitutionally because 
it fails to require proof of any connection between a bribe or 
kickback and some federal money.”63 The Court replied that it 
“do[es] not presume the unconstitutionality of federal criminal 
statutes lacking explicit provision of a jurisdictional hook[,]”64 
the nexus between the corrupt act and federal funds. Further, 
the Court expressed, “there is no occasion even to consider the 
need for such a requirement where there is no reason to 
suspect that enforcement of a criminal statute would extend 
beyond a legitimate interest cognizable under Article I, § 8.”65 
The Court further stated: 
 
Congress has authority under the Spending 
Clause to appropriate federal moneys to 
promote the general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 
and it has corresponding authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, 
to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated 
                                                          
59 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).  
60 Id. at 602. 
61 Id. 602-3. 
62 Id. at 602. 
63 Id. at 604. 
64 Id. at 605. 
65 Id.  
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under that power are in fact spent for the 
general welfare, and not frittered away in graft 
or on projects undermined when funds are 
siphoned off or corrupt public officers are 
derelict about demanding value for dollars.66 
 
After losing the first portion of the Spending Clause 
round, the petitioner went into the remainder of the round 
wielding Morrison67 and Lopez.68 In those cases of similar 
rationale, the Court reasoned, it would be necessary “to pile 
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause 
to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”69 
Thus, the congressional authority to enact such statutes was 
not present. In Sabri, however, the Court found that no pile of 
inference upon inference was needed. The federal government 
was within its “power to keep a watchful eye on expenditures 
and on the reliability of those who use public money[.]”70 
In a final effort, the petitioner asserted that the 
condition attached to such funds, i.e., that their misuse would 
result in criminal culpability, was unduly coercive under the 
Tenth Amendment-related test established in South Dakota v. 
Dole.71 If such were held true, then § 666 would be 
unconstitutional. However, the Court quickly distinguished 
Dole from the facts of Sabri by aptly stating that § 666 brings 
“federal power directly to bear on individuals who convert 
public spending into unearned private gain,” not on a State’s 
public policy decision-making ability, as in Dole.72  
Concurring,73 Justice Thomas expressed his doubt 
about the federal government’s interest his colleagues used to 
justify the congressional authority to enact § 666 under the 
                                                          
66 Id.  
67 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
68 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
69 Id. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567). 
70 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608.  
71 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).  
72 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 601.  
73 Id. at 610 (Justices Kennedy and Scalia also concurred, but only for 
the purpose of revoking their indorsement of Part III of the opinion, 
which the authoring justices deemed an “afterword”). 
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Spending Clause. He reasoned that merely noting the fungible 
nature of money does not explain how the federal government 
could gain an interest in all instances of local bribery. Justice 
Thomas provided an example: “noting that ‘[m]oney is 
fungible,’ . . .  for instance, does not explain how there could 
be any federal interest in ‘prosecut[ing] a bribe paid to a city's 
meat inspector in connection with a substantial transaction 
just because the city's parks department had received a federal 
grant of $10,000[.]’”74 Justice Thomas concluded the federal 
interest in the bribe at issue in Sabri was comparably 
attenuated, “yet the bribe is covered by the expansive 
language of § 666(a)(2).”75 
 
B. THE ACADEMIC DISCOURSE SURROUNDING § 666 
 
Sabri was announced in 2003, the same term as 
McConnell v. FEC.76 McConnell held that the federal 
government’s interest in combatting corruption outweighs the 
ever-important First Amendment rights involved in the 
political process.77 This decision coupled with Sabri, 
“confirm[ed] the high priority that the Court places on the 
National Government’s authority to fight corruption at any 
level in order to protect the democratic process and public 
confidence in it.”78 Accordingly, George D. Brown, Professor 
of Law at Boston College Law School, labeled the Court’s 2003 
term the “Anti-Corruption Term.”79  
Further, Brown predicted these two cases could be 
seen as “two important steps down the road toward more 
vigorous anti-corruption efforts.”80 On a federal level, the 
federal government’s concern with the efficiency of its 
                                                          
74 Id. at 623 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States v. 
Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88, 93 (2nd Cir. 1999)). 
75 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
76 McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), 
overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010).  
77 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44, overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010). 
78 George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and 
Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 404 (2005).  
79 Id. at 405.  
80 Id. at 407. 
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operations is clear.81 However, the federal government’s 
interest in “sub-national” corruption is significantly more 
attenuated.82 Brown posed, “What concern is to Washington if 
Smallville is inefficient, lax on ethical standards, and even 
allows their salaries through liberal use of municipal property 
and funds?”83  
First, “the conduct of all government officials is 
something the public views in unitary terms, regardless of the 
level at which it occurs. Thus, corruption at any level can 
undermine confidence in the system as a whole.”84 This 
argument is “short on empirical justification”85 but has an 
“intuitive appeal.”86 In other words, at the time this article was 
written, no studies had been conducted much less 
conclusively proven that members of the general public were 
unable to distinguish between federal, state, and local officials. 
Even if such a distinction could not be made in the minds of 
average citizens, it is unlikely that such a lack of 
understanding or misconception provided a solid basis for 
establishing the federal government’s interest necessary for § 
666’s legislation. 
Second, Brown stated that “interstate externalities” 
may be offered as a federal government’s interest.87 
Essentially, corruption in State A may affect State B. This 
inference-based justification is “the familiar race to the bottom 
argument for national intervention.”88 Brown dismissed both 
of these potential federal interests as “hardly 
overwhelming.”89 Moreover, conceivable federal interests 
used to justify federal prosecution of state and local actors 
under federal bribery programs “run directly counter to . . . 
New Federalism.”90 
 
                                                          
81 Id. at 409.  
82 Id. at 409-10. 
83 Id.  





89 Id. at 411.  
90 Id.  
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IV. NEW FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL ANTI-CORRUPTION 
STATUTES 
 
The late 1990’s and early 2000’s saw, perhaps, the main 
thrust of the resurgence of federalism principles.91 “New 
Federalism,” as it was dubbed, is essentially two principles: an 
emphasis on the Constitution’s enumeration of federal powers 
as limiting the powers of the federal government,92 and the 
concept of states as quasi-sovereign, largely autonomous 
entities owed great respect by the co-equal national 
government.93 New Federalism principles are likely the most 
controversial Rehnquist Court legacies.94  
One prevailing theme of the Rehnquist Court’s New 
Federalism “insiste[d] that it is the task of the Justices to 
enforce both textual and structural limitations on federal 
power – i.e., that ‘political safeguards are not enough[.]’”95  
 
Structural federalism is sometimes said by the 
Justices not only to facilitate optimal outcomes 
through competition and choice, or diversity 
and experimentation; the Court's decisions and 
reasoning are animated as well by claims that 
decisionmakers and regulators ought to be 
“accountable” to those they serve, and that this 
accountability is enhanced by the dual 
sovereignty and decentralization preserved by 
our Constitution.96 
                                                          
91 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. 
REV. 7, 7 (2001) (“[T]here has been a revolution with regard to the 
structure of the American government because of the Supreme Court 
decisions in the last few years regarding federalism.”); Lynn Baker, 
The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 195 
(2001).  
92 See, e.g., Pritnz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-30 (1997).  
93 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 47, 54, 72, 76 (1996). 
94 Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and 
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2003).  
95 Id. at 15 (citing See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back 
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001)). 
96 Garnett, 89 CORNELL L. REV. at 20 (citing See, e.g., Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 




It is from this view of the Constitution’s “text, history, 
and structure”97 that produces the congressional authority 
battle played out in the context of federal corruption statutes. 
Particularly at issue is the federal government’s power or 
authority to enact legislation which reaches state and local 
officials. 
 
A. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 
TO ENACT § 666: HENNING’S CORRUPTION LEGACY 
 
Peter J. Henning, Professor of Law at Wayne State 
University, offered a potential source of congressional 
authority to enact § 666 by offering a novel argument that the 
Constitution has an “Anti-Corruption Legacy.”98 Henning 
argued that congressional involvement in the prosecution of 
state and local official is not a threat to federalism.99 In fact, 
Henning believed federalism is strengthened by federal 
prosecution of such crimes because corruption at state and 
local levels undermines the balance federalism creates.100  
In support of congressional authority to combat 
corruption at the federal level, Henning cited:  
  
“Bribery” as one of the grounds for 
impeachment; the prohibition of both change in 
the President's compensation during his term of 
office and of his receipt of “‘any other 
Emolument from the United States, or any of 
them”’; the prohibition on federal officeholders' 
receipt of emoluments from foreign sources; the 
prohibition on members of Congress being 
appointed “to any federal office ‘which shall 
                                                                                                                           
(“We have addressed the heightened federalism and nondelegation 
concerns that agency pre-emption raises by using the presumption to 
build a procedural bridge across the political accountability gap 
between States and administrative agencies.”)). 
97 Garnett, 89 CORNELL L. REV. at 22. 
98 Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and 
Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 80-2 (2003).  
99 Id. at 81-2.  
100 Id. 
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have been created, or the Emoluments whereof 
shall have been encreased during such time’ 
that the member was in office[; and,] [t]he 
Appropriations Clause requir[ing] 
congressional authorization before [the 
executive] can disburse funds.”101 
 
Taken in conjunction with one another, Henning asserted 
these Constitutional provisions are “structural standards 
designed to limit the possibility of corruption in the Federal 
government.”102 
 Regarding Constitutional provisions creating structural 
standards applicable to the federal government combatting 
corruption at the state level, Henning cites two constitutional 
provisions: the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial 
and the Article III provision for diversity jurisdiction of federal 
courts.103 Both, in his view, provide a certain level of 
protection against corrupt state and local government bias in 
judicial proceedings.104  
 Henning’s “Anti-Corruption Legacy” argument 
regarding the federal government’s authority to criminalize 
acts of its own employees is unnecessary. The federal 
government has a clear interest in and authority to regulate 
the acts of its employees which are likely to undermine the 
employee’s duties. Thus, Henning likely made those points for 
purposes of boosting his Anti-Corruption Legacy argument 
relating to the criminalization of acts of state and local 
officials.  
 After close examination, the inferences and logical 
backflips needed to find congressional authority to criminalize 
and prosecute various acts of state and local officials under 
this Anti-Corruption Legacy argument are hardly persuasive 
due to their less-than-concrete nature. Such inferences may 
frighten a jurist or academician wishing to build a 
congressional authority argument on such a basis. George D. 
                                                          
101 George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and 
Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 415-416 (2005) 
(citing Henning, 92 KY. L.J. at 86-7).  
102 Henning, 92 KY. L.J. at 87.  
103 Id. at 89. 
104 Id. at 91. 
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Brown agreed that Henning’s an argument is “hardly 
dispositive”105 and he, along with Adam H. Kurland, 
discussed another potential source of congressional power to 
regulate the conduct at issue, the Guarantee Clause. 
 
B. KURLAND AND THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE 
  
Kurland, Professor of Law at Howard University, a 
strong advocate for prosecution on a federal level, wrote that 
federal prosecution of state and local officials on the basis of 
congressional authority such as the Commerce Clause was 
dubious.106 Thus, Kurland looked elsewhere in the 
Constitution for congressional authority. His search led him to 
examine the Guarantee Clause. The Guarantee Clause states, 
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government[.]”107 Kurland 
believes: 
 
[T]he primary federal interest in combating 
local corruption . . . is based on the principle 
that the public is entitled to honest government 
at all levels. The faith that the citizenry places in 
all levels of government is the foundation of the 
republic. Thus, anything that erodes that 
foundation is of substantial federal interest. The 
citizens of the United States are therefore 
entitled to federal protection from abuses of 
power by those who govern.108 
 
Further, Kurland saw the Guarantee Clause as akin to 
the Fourteenth Amendment in that he views it as “a 
constitutional provision that necessarily intrudes on state 
                                                          
105 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 417.  
106 Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal 
Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 486 
(1989).  
107 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.   
108 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 418 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REV. at 376-77).  
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sovereignty and alters the normal federal state balance.”109 
Additionally, Kurland believed the Guarantee Clause could be 
a source of congressional power to enact a generally applicable 
anti-corruption statute.110  
The immediate benefit of his thesis is that it is a 
plausible basis for “dealing directly with the problem of the 
prosecutions: validation under a general statute, of those 
prosecutions.”111 However, Congress has never taken such a 
broad view of its power.112 More importantly, recent Supreme 
Court discussion of the Guarantee Clause seems to view the 
clause more “as a source of state autonomy than a font of 
federal power.”113 Thus, New Federalism, discussed 
previously, blocks the Guarantee Clause from being a source a 
federal power, at least as it is currently viewed.  
 
V. OPERATION ROCKY TOP - AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY 
& RESTRICTING § 666’S SCOPE BY ADDING A 
JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT 
 
A. OPERATION ROCKY TOP 
 
By 1985, fearing circumvention of Tennessee’s strict 
gambling prohibitions, the Tennessee General Assembly 
began to heavily regulate charitable bingo operations, which 
were generating an estimated $31 million a year.114 For 
instance, the legislature began limiting the times a person 
could play within a specified time period and the types of 
                                                          
109 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 419 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REV. at 459). 
110 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REV. at 452-53). 
111 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420. 
112 Id. (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. at 493).  
113 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at  918-9  
(listing the Guarantee Clause among provisions that reflect the 
Constitution's commitment to state sovereignty)). 
114 Interview with Tennessee State Senator Randy McNally, 
Chairman of the Finance, Ways, & Means Committee, in Oak Ridge, 
TN. (Mar. 21, 2015); Ronald Smothers, Tennessee Republicans See an 
Election Weapon in State’s Bingo Scandal,  N.Y. TIMES, January 28, 1990, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/28/us/tennessee-
republicans-see-an-election-weapon-in-state-s-bingo-scandal.html.  
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prizes which could be won.115 During this time, the Secretary 
of State’s office oversaw compliance with the relevant bingo 
law and regulations.116 
In the fall of 1985, then-state Representative James R. 
“Randy” McNally (“McNally”), who represented a portion of 
East Tennessee, received a call from a member of the local 
chapter of the Fraternal Order of Eagles (“Eagles”), an 
organization geared toward health-related charitable efforts,117 
and the member told McNally of concerns he had with the 
bingo practices of a local branch of the Army & Navy Union 
(“Army-Navy”),118 an armed services veteran’s social 
organization. The Eagles member explained that Army-Navy 
was not adhering to Tennessee law in various ways.119 
Consequentially, McNally began to investigate the law and 
Army-Navy.120  
Simultaneous to investigating the matter, McNally 
contacted Secretary of State’s office, and expressed his 
concerns about the practices of the Army-Navy branch, and he 
asked the office to look into Army-Navy’s practices.121 By 
February of 1986, McNally said he was frustrated because his 
efforts to prompt the Secretary of State to investigate “were 
going nowhere.”122 At approximately the same time, McNally 
received a call from three fellow House members, and one in 
particular asked McNally to meet with a Bingo Association 
lobbyist. Initially, McNally was reluctant; however, as a 
courtesy, he consented.123  
                                                          
115 Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally (Mar. 21, 2015) 
(on file with author). 
116 Gentry Crowell, 57; Top Tennessee Aide, N.Y. TIMES, December 22, 
1989, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/22/obituaries/gentry-crowell-
57-top-tennessee-aide.html.  
117 Fraternal Order of Eagles, About, 
http://www.foe.com/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). 
118 Army and Navy Union, Home, 
http://www.armyandnavyunion.org/home/ (last visited Mar. 22, 
2015).  
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At the end of the same legislative work week, McNally 
met with the lobbyist at the Hermitage for a luncheon to 
discuss bingo practices.124 McNally explained that “the 
meeting went normally until the [lobbyist] said some of the 
legislators that [the lobbyist] dealt with liked to get their 
money during campaign season, and others liked the money 
to be spread out over the year.”125 McNally found the 
statement deeply unsettling.126 What type of money was the 
lobbyist talking about-- campaign contributions or something 
else? Even if he were only referencing legal campaign 
contributions, why would the legislators prefer the funds be 
“spread out” over the year? 
He considered the statement over the weekend, and 
returned to Nashville the proceeding Monday but was unsure 
how to proceed.127 He worried about being framed as an 
“alarmist.”128 As a Rotary Club member, McNally attended a 
Rotary meeting that Monday, and the civic-driven message 
conveyed by the meeting, pushed him to delve deeper into the 
lobbyist’s statement, regardless of the potential political and 
social ramifications.129 He called the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“F.B.I.”).130 
A call screener at the F.B.I.’s Nashville office answered 
the phone, obtained the necessary information, and told 
McNally he would be contacted soon.131 Within five minutes, 
they called back.132 F.B.I. agent, Richard Knudsen, expressed 
that the F.B.I. was interested in McNally’s information.133 
Additionally, McNally learned that Knudsen had been 
working in conjunction with an agent of the Tennessee Bureau 
of Investigation (“T.B.I.”), Roger Farley, on this matter.134  





128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
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McNally was instructed not to initiate conversations 
with the Bingo Association’s lobbyist.135 McNally said, “if [he] 
called, I was supposed to tell them, ‘I was ok; I was satisfied’ 
with the legality of their operation.”136 Approximately two 
weeks after the Hermitage luncheon, another player revealed 
himself.137 
W.D. “Donnie” Walker (“Walker”), head of the 
Charitable Solicitations division of the Secretary of State’s 
office, contacted McNally, and ominously asked, “everything 
ok?”138 McNally gave an affirmative response, but the 
interested parties must not have been convinced because a 
week later, while McNally was on his way to a committee 
meeting in the General Assembly’s main office building, the 
War Memorial Building, the Bingo Association’s lobbyist 
handed McNally a white envelope, and said, “we appreciate 
you.”139 
As a result, he was immediately faced with a crucial 
decision: whether to risk raising alarm by skipping the 
committee meeting and reporting the event, or go to the 
meeting with an envelope filled with unknown content in his 
coat jacket’s side pocket.140 After a brief moment of 
consideration, McNally called Agents Knudsen and Farley.141 
The agents told McNally to leave the immense, yet crowded, 
office building without being seen, and they would pick him 
up immediately.142 
After stopping at nearby fast-food restaurant, the 
agents took the envelope from McNally, examined it, and 
preserved it as evidence.143 Upon opening the envelope, 
McNally found three hundred dollars.144 At the direction of 
the agents, McNally made a recorded phone call to the 
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lobbyist.145 McNally thanked him for the money and expressly 
asked whether it should reported as a campaign 
contribution.146 The lobbyist said they did not intent to report 
it, and neither should he.147 
A lull in the relevant events occurred until June of 1986 
when the “drop dead” contribution reporting date 
approached.148 McNally was concerned about whether to 
report the three-hundred dollars because the Secretary of State 
oversaw the reporting and recording of contributions.149 The 
F.B.I. was proceeding with a particular degree of caution 
because Abscam, a corruption investigation ending with the 
overturning of several charges due to entrapment issues, was 
a not-so-distant memory.150 The F.B.I. and T.B.I. wanted more 
evidence, so when the lobbyist in question came calling, they 
sent McNally to meet with him in July of 1986.151 
Prior to the meeting, set to take place at the Regas in 
Knoxville, McNally was fitted with a wire and transmitting 
device. He was “sweating bullets” during the dinner.152 The 
conversation centered around lobbying and the Army-Navy 
matter.153 The lobbyist explained that he knew “how the 
[legislative] game was played.”154 With McNally (and 
investigating officials) listening, he proceeded to tell McNally 
that the game is best played when a lobbyist can get close to a 
legislator, obtain money for the legislator to vote a certain way 
on a hotly-contested bill, and the legislator and lobbyist split 
the corresponding illegal funds.155 To the investigators’ and 
McNally’s deeper surprise, the lobbyist cited specific votes 
and members the lobbyist had helped influence.156  
The dinner had gone on quite some time when 
suddenly McNally heard the previously set codeword over the 
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Regas’s intercom system.157 He quickly excused himself, and 
met with agents in the men’s bathroom.158 Apparently, the 
tape recorder he was wearing was nearly out of recording 
capacity, and McNally was forced to end the dinner quickly 
without raising suspicion.159 McNally returned to the table, 
and the dinner ended anti-climatically with no further 
material facts developing, and to much disappointment, no 
money was exchanged.160 
Tapes in hand, the F.B.I. brought the case before 
Washington officials.161 After reviewing the tapes, the 
investigation received high priority, i.e., reinforcements were 
deployed.162 Most notably, the F.B.I. sent an undercover agent 
to pose as a lobbyist.163 
In September of 1986, another major effort to gather 
evidence occurred.164 The lobbyist, Walker, and McNally met 
in the parking lot of an East Tennessee hospital.165 With the 
F.B.I. and T.B.I. watching, McNally received one-thousand 
dollars after feigning dissatisfaction with the prior bribe.166 
Serendipitously, reports of a peeping Tom had been made to 
the local police, and the entire surveillance of the event was 
almost exposed when a local police unit rolled by and saw the 
surveillance van.167  
Thinking the van may be connected to the peeping 
Tom reports, the local police officer got out, and began asking 
questions of the T.B.I. and F.B.I. agents within.168 Quickly, the 
agents identified themselves, and asked the officer to leave.169 
Meanwhile, McNally calmed the lobbyist and Walker, who 
had seen the local police unit, by telling them to “just be 
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cool.”170 When the officer left, the parties went their separate 
ways.171  
In November of 1986, McNally was elected to the 
Tennessee Senate.172 Nearly three years later, the investigation 
was publicly announced by the F.B.I. and T.B.I.173 Many and 
varying federal indictments were issued as result of the 
information gathered as a result of the information collected 
by F.B.I, the T.B.I., and McNally.174 Particularly, the lobbyist 
and Walker were offered plea deals in return for 
cooperation.175 Both initially rejected.176 However, the ‘big 
break” in the case occurred when Walker became a witness for 
the prosecution.177 “Mr. Walker . . . pleaded guilty in a plea 
agreement and provided details of how he helped operators 
obtain fraudulent charters as charities so that they could 
legally organize bingo games.”178  
Walker detailed that he arranged “secret partnerships” 
in the operations for some current and former elected officials, 
and he helped organize the bingo operators into a group 
called ''the Association,'' whose goal was funneling money to 
legislators willing to become a part of a secret partnership.179 
“Armed with Mr. Walker's testimony, grand juries began their 
indictments. Among those indicted were a former member of 
the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, a labor leader, a former 
legislator, and State Election Commissioner and an incumbent 
legislator[,]”180 as well as the previously discussed defendants. 
Operation Rocky Top reached its highest political actor 
with Secretary of State. After testifying before the federal 
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grand jury, the Secretary was called another time.181 Knowing 
that the recall was likely to end in his indictment, he 
committed suicide.182 In response to the revelations of the 
investigation, the Tennessee General Assembly established 
new, more rigid ethical boundaries: limits on campaign 
contributions and new lobbying restrictions.183 However, 
perhaps federal intervention was unnecessary.  
  
B. AN ADDITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT 
 
The rationale used by the Court to support 
congressional authority to pass § 666 is arguably 
unconvincing. The highly policed Commerce Clause provided 
no basis; the Taxing and Spending rationale of Salinas and 
Sabri is wanting; Henning’s “Anti-Corruption Legacy” begged 
for serious inferences, and the Guarantee Clause provided no 
help in the face of the resurgence of Federalism principles, i.e., 
New Federalism.  
If, as a counterfactual, § 666 were found to have been 
without congressional authority and Senator McNally had 
accepted the bribes offered, the F.B.I.’s lack of power  to 
investigate the matter would not cause the sky to fall on the 
heads of the people of the State of Tennessee. The State, a 
quasi-sovereign federalism partner, would address the matter 
from an investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicative role. 
Specifically, the T.B.I.’s white collar division would 
investigate, seek to prosecute, and have the matter of public 
corruption adjudicated. 
At the heart of federal corruption statutes is the lack of 
trust the federal government has in states to discover, 
investigate, and fairly adjudicate a matter of corruption which 
involves the state’s local and/or state-level officials. The 
federal assumption essentially is that a state from which 
corruption spawns is thereby ill-equipped to help itself, to 
                                                          
181 Tennessee Secretary of State Dies after Suicide Attempt, DAILY NEWS, 




183 Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally, supra note 115. 
138                                                 4 LMU LAW REVIEW (2016) 
 
address the matter. This assumption is a fallacy of the worst 
order. It is a generalization.  
All states in which corruption exists are not necessarily 
unable to address the matter merely because a corrupt act 
germinated within its boundaries. A determination as to 
whether the state is capable of addressing the matter must be 
made with regard to the nature and extent of the corrupt 
activities at issue. If the corrupt activities are so pervasive as to 
call reasonable doubt as to whether the state agency or branch 
of government in charge of investigating, prosecuting, or 
adjudicating the matter can fairly handle the matter then, 
perhaps, federal intervention is needed. Otherwise, the state 
should be allowed to address the matter with its agents and 
under its criminal law.  
To effectuate this policy, § 666’s jurisdictional hook 
need only be amended. The jurisdictional hook currently 
requires, an agent of a State, local government or agency to 
corruptly solicit or accept anything of value of $5,000 or more, 
and such organization of which that agent is a part receive 
$10,000 in federal benefits within a year’s time.184 It should be 
amended to additionally require that “there be reasonable 
belief that the state agency or agencies with jurisdiction to 
investigate, prosecute, or adjudicate the alleged corrupt matter 
will be unable to fairly decide whether to proceed with the 
matter due to potential bias, political or otherwise, created by 
the pervasive nature of the corruption scheme at issue.”  
This additional requirement would, in effect, remedy 
the generalization fallacy at the heart of § 666 as well as curb 
the nearly boundless scope of the statute. The concern 
regarding the lack of significant, traceable federal interest 
articulated by Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Sabri would 
also be quieted because the federal government could 
articulate reasonable doubt as to the ability of the state to 
handle the state or local matter, and thereby gain an interest in 
legislating and enforcing § 666.  
Take Justice Thomas’s city meat inspector example. 
Recalling his concurrence in Sabri, Justice Thomas was 
unpersuaded by the argument that the fungible nature of 
money gave rise to a federal interest in prosecuting a bribe 
paid to a city's meat inspector in connection with a substantial 
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transaction just because the city's parks department had 
received a federal grant of $10,000.185 The additional 
jurisdictional requirement as to the ability of the state to 
handle the matter of the unsavory meat inspector would add 
significant weight to the federal government’s interest that 
Justice Thomas felt unconvincingly light (or non-existent).  
To have palpable impact, the suggested additional 
jurisdictional requirement would necessarily have to be one 
which is proven to the jury at the time of trial. From an 
evidentiary perspective, for the federal government to able to 
proceed with the prosecution of the meat inspector, they 
would be required to produce evidence showing that the state 
would be unable to fairly decide whether to further investigate 
and potentially prosecute because, to extend facts of the 
example, the meat inspector’s unscrupulous behavior was 
merely a small tributary of a much larger, pervasive 
corruption scheme—a scheme which reasonably could leave a 
state-led investigation without the ability to fairly decide 
whether to proceed. 
Specifically, the federal government would be required 
to produce evidence showing that the local or state regulatory 
agency in charge of the meat inspector’s compliance with 
applicable law was tainted by the corruption scheme. Ideally, 
the federal government would produce evidence, such as 
video recordings, financial statements, or collaborative 
testimony, which demonstrates further bribes or a portion of 
the briberous scheme reached the highest overseeing local and 
state actors as to render those actors without the ability, due to 
their involvement, to execute their investigative duties.  
In the context of Operation Rocky Top, if McNally had 
taken a $5000 bribe, § 666 would be applicable because the 
State of Tennessee receives far more than $10,000 in federal 
benefits in a year’s time, and the bribe would have been in 
connection with his capacity as a legislator. Should the 
additional jurisdictional element suggested have existed then, 
the federal prosecutor would have had to demonstrate to the 
jury that the T.B.I., the state prosecutorial authority, or state 
adjudicating body was unable to fairly decide whether to 
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proceed with the matter due its bias, political or otherwise, 
created by the pervasive nature of the corruption scheme.  
Ideally, the prosecutor would present lawfully 
obtained testimony, recordings, or official or business records 
which would show that the bingo-related illegal funds or 
political influence spread from the legislature and into the 
relevant investigatory department of the T.B.I., the 
prosecuting official, or adjudicative body as to taint a link in 
the state’s criminal justice process.  
Specifically, the new element could have been satisfied 
by a prosecutorial showing of the scheme’s taint reaching the 
relevant, white-collar arm of the T.B.I. or the local judicial 
official who would likely hear the case if filed. Such a showing 
would demonstrate a reasonable belief that the pervasive 
nature of the corruption scheme at issue destroyed the 
objective stance of state agency tasked with the investigation, 
prosecution, or adjudication of the Association’s bingo-related 
practices. A taint of this nature would, in effect, render the 
state’s justice process unable to properly address the 
corruption matter. Upon that evidentiary showing, then 
federal interdiction into a state or local corruption matter 
would be proper. 
However, the facts of investigation fell short of this 
jurisdictional requirement due to the fact that no evidence was 
presented that the corruption scheme reached into the T.B.I. or 
the state court system which would have adjudicated the 
matter. Had these been contemporary events and had the 
additional jurisdictional hook been in place, the State of 
Tennessee’s semi-autonomous nature would have been 
respected and left undisturbed by federal intervention. 
   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Since Dixson, courts have seen the scope of § 201 
become nearly boundless, and cases limiting its scope have 
had a nominal effect.186 By preemptively passing § 666, 
Congress further augmented the scope federal corruption 
crimes. After discussing various potential sources of 
congressional authority, the unconvincing Spending Clause 
                                                          
186 See, e.g., Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc).  
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rationale was revealed. Startlingly, the Court stated that the 
federal interest required for congressional authority to pass § 
666 stemmed from the fact that $10,000 in federal funds were 
merely in the vicinity of corruption. In the face of New 
Federalism, such logic, such a tenuous articulation of federal 
interest cannot stand. However, a solution was presented.  
The additional requirement to § 666’s jurisdictional 
hook, i.e., the federal government would be required to 
forbear intervention into what could largely be qualified as an 
intra-state matter unless the federal government could 
demonstrate the state’s inability to help itself, would 
significantly lessen the tenuous nature of the federal interest as 
well as satisfy New Federalism principles, at least from a 
theoretical perspective. 
To demonstrate the jurisdictional requirement’s 
pragmatic efficacy, Operation Rocky Top, a Tennessee 
corruption investigation, served as case study in which 
examples of how such a requirement could be met with a 
sufficient evidentiary showing. In short, the requirement 
would place a duly heavy burden on a federal prosecutor 
pursuing a § 666 action against a state actor, but that is 
precisely the point. Such a heavy burden is necessary to give 
the federal government its required interest in the criminal 
matter and comport with New Federalism principles. The 
additional jurisdictional requirement reins federal authority, 
and by predicating federal authority on a respect for a state’s 
semi-autonomous nature, the federal government is placed in 
an on-deck posture.  
 
